[DOWNLOAD] "Some Problems with the Shared Meaning Rule As Formulated in R. V. Daoust and 'the Law of Bilingual Interpretation'" by Ruth Sullivan " Book PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Some Problems with the Shared Meaning Rule As Formulated in R. V. Daoust and 'the Law of Bilingual Interpretation'
- Author : Ruth Sullivan
- Release Date : January 22, 2010
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 132 KB
Description
This article offers a critical analysis of the account of the shared meaning rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Daoust and subsequently defended by the authors of The Law of Bilingual Interpretation, including retired Justice Michel Bastarache who wrote the unanimous judgment of the Court in Daoust. The author argues that, contrary to the position taken in Daoust, the presumption of shared meaning should not arise when one language version of a legislative text is clear but broad while the other is clear but narrow. She suggests that relying on the presumption in these circumstances focuses too narrowly on the norms of linguistic equality and the protection of minority language rights while inappropriately neglecting the norms of rule of law and linguistic security. The position taken in Daoust can only be justified by the textualist assumption that the literal meaning of a text -and by extension the shared literal meaning of the text--can be equated with legislative intent. This textualist assumption is inconsistent with the modern principle of interpretation that has been repeatedly endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada. She endorses and justifies an alternative formulation of the shared meaning rule. Cet article presente une analyse critique du principe du sens commun, adopte par la Cour supreme du Canada dans l'arret R c Daoust, que les auteurs de Le droit de l'interpretation bilingue ont par la suite defendu, notamment le juge a la retraite Michel Bastarache, qui a redige la decision unanime de la Cour dans Daoust. L'auteure soutient que, contrairement a la position adoptee dans Daoust, la presomption du sens commun ne devrait pas etre invoquee lorsque la version dans une langue d'un texte legislatif est claire mais large alors que la version dans l'autre langue est claire mais plus restreinte. Elle est d'avis que si l'on se fie a la presomption dans ces circonstances, on se concentre trop sur les normes regissant l'egalite linguistique et la protection des droits des minorites linguistiques au detriment du principe de la primaute du droit et des normes de la securite linguistique. La position degagee dans l'arret Daoust ne peut se justifier qu'en vertu du postulat de nature textuelle selon lequel la signification litterale d'un texte--et par extension le sens litteral commun du texte--peut equivaloir a l'intention du legislateur. Ce postulat va a l'encontre du principe moderne de l'interpretation que la Cour supreme du Canada a maintes fois enterine. L'auteure avalise et justifie une formulation de rechange a la regle du sens commun.